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 P R O C E E D I N G S 
November 9, 2016                 2:04 P.M. 
THE CLERK:  Calling Civil Matter 16-213, Fields
versus Twitter, Incorporated.
Counsel, please come forward and state your appearance.
MR. ARISOHN:  Josh Arisohn of Bursor and Fisher on
behalf of the plaintiffs.  Good afternoon, your Honor.
THE COURT:  Good afternoon.
MR. CAROME:  Good afternoon, your Honor.  Patrick
Carome on behalf of defendant Twitter.
THE COURT:  Good afternoon.
So, Mr. Arisohn, I have -- you're not going to be
surprised -- the same problems that I've had before with your
complaint.
The provision of -- I think I dealt with each of these
issues in my prior order.  I don't see that the provision of
accounts theory is distinguishable from publishing activity as
I found before, and it's protected by Section 230(c) of the
Communications Decency Act.
I think the decision to furnish an account will prohibit
one from using one's inherently publishing activity and I think
the causation issue is still dispositive.
So, and I don't think the direct messaging theory works,
again, for the same reasons.  I think Section 230(c)(1) reaches
private communications beyond simply defamation.
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And I -- you know, I feel for your clients.  And it's a
tragic situation and ISIS is a horrible terrorist group, but
that doesn't mean that Twitter was responsible for the death of
Mr. Fields or Mr. Creach.
So that's my view.  I will have two questions.  One, I
will let you explain to me why the second amended complaint is
different than the first.  But my second question will be:  Do
you have -- assuming that I don't change my mind on the
tentative, are you ready to take this up or do you need another
amendment to perfect your appeal?
MR. ARISOHN:  Thank you, your Honor.
I understand your position.  I understand I have an uphill
battle here, but with your position I would like to go through
the arguments and see where they go.
THE COURT:  Go ahead.
MR. ARISOHN:  We carefully studied the Court's order
on the last motion to dismiss and considered them carefully in
drafting the second amended complaint and I think we
incorporated a lot of those thoughts and addressed the Court's
concerns as best we could, particularly in the way that we
organized the complaint to show the ways in which we were and
were not relying on content here.  
So the first point is that the cause of action here falls
under 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), which creates a private right of
action for violations of the Anti Terrorism Act, material
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support provisions.  And the ones alleged here are 2339(a) and
(b), both of which, with different language, prohibit the
provision of material support to terrorists.
And that is the gist of our allegations here; that Twitter
violated these material support provisions when it gave ISIS
Twitter accounts.  And the way we have organized the complaint
now sets it out more clearly, that those material support
provisions were violated when the accounts were handed to ISIS,
not when ISIS issued Tweets or content from those accounts.
And the sections of the complaint setting out the violations of
those material support statutes, in fact, now don't refer to
content in any way, shape or form.
And so the question becomes:  Is providing ISIS with a
Twitter account in and of itself -- and not being tethered to
content, can that be considered a publishing activity?  And if
you look at what the Ninth Circuit has said and how it has
defined "publishing activity" in the Barnes decision, it
described it as, "reviewing, editing or deciding whether to
publish or withdraw content."  
Providing someone with a Twitter account doesn't implicate
any of those activities.  Providing ISIS with a Twitter account
is a different activity from deciding whether ISIS should be
permitted to Tweet out specific content.  It's -- providing an
account is providing someone with a tool.  It's a content
neutral decision.
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If you hand someone a typewriter, that's not a
content-based publishing activity.  If you start deciding what
they can do with that typewriter and write and disseminate with
that typewriter, it becomes content based.  Our allegations
here are only on the provision of the tool in the first place.
And the case that Twitter has relied on here, and I know
the Court has cited it, is the BackPage.com case.  But I think
if you really look at what was going on in that case, BackPage
is distinguishable because the allegations at issue in that
case were tethered to specific content at the core of the
allegations in a way that our case is not.
In the BackPage case, BackPage was providing classifieds
for escorts on its website and the plaintiff said, their
allegation was that BackPage had constructed its website in a
way that it aided sex traffickers.
But what they were really saying was that they constructed
their website in a way that they were making content-based
decisions in the construction of their website.  And so the key
allegations there were that the defendant -- was that the
defendant designed its website so that sex traffickers could
hide sensitive information, including their phone numbers, and
they allowed emails to be anonymized, and photos were stripped
of metadata, and payments could be made anonymously.
And so the allegation was that making construction
decisions about the website that went specifically to this
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content was at the heart of the issue.  So these were
content-based decisions, even if they were made through the
prism of a website construction.
And so BackPage doesn't stand for the proposition that
just giving someone an account on a website is publishing
activity.  It stands for something much more narrow, which is
that if you construct a website in a way to tailor content,
that that's the same as making a content-based publishing
decision and that's not what we're -- that's not what we're
alleging here.
I think such a ruling would extend the CDA far beyond
where any Court has taken it to date.  And I think that the
Court should be wary of doing that because the Ninth Circuit
has now warned on several occasions that Courts should not
extend the CDA beyond the narrow scope that Congress set out.
Now, as to how we are using content, it is limited to one
area of our claim and that is to show proximate causation.  But
I think if you look at Ninth Circuit precedent, in particular
the Barnes and the Internet Brands decisions, those cases stand
for the proposition that if you are relying on content just to
show causation as part of proving or alleging the causal chain,
that that by itself does not implicate the protections of the
CDA.
And so in Barnes that was the case, where the
promissory --
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THE COURT:  I remember.
MR. ARISOHN:  And based on Yahoo's failure to remove
an offensive profile that was posted by the plaintiff's
ex-boyfriend.
So the theory of liability there was based on Yahoo's
promise to remove the profile and plaintiff's reliance.  And
the claim, nevertheless, had to refer on published content
because she had to show that the failure to remove the profile
injured her because the contents in that profile was offensive
and having it out there in the wider world caused her injury.
The Ninth Circuit allowed her claim to go forward despite
reliance on this content as part of the causal chain and held
that the CDA didn't apply.
And it was the same thing in the Internet Brands case.
That was the failure to warn case where plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's website knew that rapists were using its
website to lure victims.  And there the theory of liability was
a special relationship, foreseeable harm and failure to warn a
potential victim.
And, again, the claim required reference to content that
was on the website, but the claim was allowed to go forward
because the reference to the content was limited to the causal
analysis.  They had to show that the rapists were only able to
contact the plaintiffs because their information was available
on the website.  And the Ninth Circuit said that that alone is
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not sufficient for the CDA to apply because publishing activity
is the but-for cause of just about everything that these
internet companies do.
So, in other words, just because publishing activity is
referenced, solely referenced to the causal analysis, that
doesn't mean that the CDA applies.
And I would say that the same thing is what's happening
here.  Ms. Fields and Ms. Creach and their family are alleging
that Twitter knowingly provided Twitter accounts to ISIS, and
that's the basis of their claim.  And they are only referencing
contents of Tweets to show that ISIS used these accounts to
gain finances and recruits for themselves so they could go out
and perpetrate attacks like the one in which Mr. Fields and
Mr. Creach were killed.
THE COURT:  Even though Abu Zaid, there was no
evidence that he ever used Twitter, that ISIS ever said
anything with respect to this particular event, and there are
no facts alleging that the attack was in any way aided by
ISIS's social media presence.
MR. ARISOHN:  Well, I'll turn to proximate causation,
because that seems to be what you're getting to.
So the key thing for proximate causation under the Anti
Terrorism Act is that there is no directness requirement.  That
is the opinion that's being expressed by numerous Courts.
So you don't have to trace material support to a specific
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attack.  It's enough, in case after case, many cases that I've
worked on myself, if you show that material support was
provided to a terrorist organization and then that terrorist
organization separately perpetrated an attack, that is
sufficient.  And the reason behind that is that material
support, whether it's financial or otherwise, is fungible.
And so as Judge Posner noted in one of his decisions under
the ATA, even if a contribution is not used directly by a
terrorist organization, it can be used indirectly because it
opens up funds elsewhere within the organization.  And so the
fungibility of material support means that there is no
directness requirement.  All you have to show is that you
provided the support to the terrorist organization and that the
terrorist organization committed the attack.
And we have done that here.  I think we've shown that
Twitter provided material support to ISIS.  These accounts were
very valuable and it helped them raise funds and recruit
people.  And then that allowed funds to open up and resources
to open up that helped them carry out this attack.  
And we've adequately alleged that ISIS was responsible for
this attack.  We cite to evidence that the perpetrator, Abu
Zaid, was a member of an ISIS cell, and we refer to two claims
of responsibility by ISIS.  I don't think we could possibly
require more in terms of how to properly allege proximate
causation.
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And, you know, the CDA part of the argument, I think
that's, you know, new ground to a certain extent, but this --
these proximate causation allegations fall squarely within
where other cases have gone.  And I think a ruling that
proximate causation hasn't been adequately alleged here would
fall far outside the mainstream of where other Courts have gone
in that.
THE COURT:  All right.
Mr. Carome.
MR. CAROME:  Thank you, your Honor.
Twitter certainly shares the Court's view that what
happened to the plaintiffs here is ghastly, horrible and that
ISIS is horrible.
Obviously, what this case is about is whether a liability
could be extended all the way to Twitter for its having simply
done for -- allegedly for some number of people associated with
ISIS what it has done for hundreds of millions of other people
around the world, simply providing them with a service open to
all.
I don't think that plaintiff has made any new arguments.
I think this is essentially a motion for reconsideration.
The reorganization of the complaint is really completely
irrelevant to the provision of accounts theory, which is the
theory he's relying on.
Also, many Courts repeatedly, including the Ninth Circuit,
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have said that Section 230 immunity depends on the inherent
nature of the claim, not on how it's cosmetically pled, not on
artful pleading or creative pleading, not on the labels you put
on your claim or on the sections of the complaint.  And that is
all that is different here.
Moreover, by having a section of his complaint that
says -- labeled "Proximate Cause" that is replete with all
of -- virtually all of the allegations about the content that
were there before had really just confirmed that this is a
complaint that is based on the content, both in terms of the
nature of the claim -- we wouldn't be having a case at all if
it were not for -- if members of ISIS or associates of ISIS had
opened accounts and done nothing with them.  Obviously, we're
only here today solely based on claims as to how those accounts
were used.
And simply, you know, proximate cause is an essential
element of the Section 2333(a) claim.  And they have doubled
down.  I mean, they have relied fully on content.  This is all
about, really, a claim that Twitter failed to block content
appearing on the service.
This is really -- and as your Honor has noted in your
August 10th decision, there -- the decisions about who may open
or keep a Twitter account are themselves decisions about what
content may appear.  There is no way to distinguish those two
things.
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In fact, the opening of a Twitter account itself is
content.  It is a message that, you know, follow me with this
screen name that I've created.  You cannot open a Twitter
account -- you can't separate out the opening of a Twitter
account from the publishing of content.
The new allegation about Mr. Zaid, Abu Zaid allegedly
having been part of an ISIS sleeper cell back when he was in
college at some indefinite period of time doesn't change
anything in terms of any connection between Twitter and what
Twitter did and -- and the attack, the horrible attack in
Jordan.
And, in fact -- and this is really directed perhaps more
to proximate cause than to anything else.  Your Honor, in your
August 10th opinion, spelled out that the only arguable
connection alleged in the first amended complaint, the prior
complaint between Abu Zaid and Twitter, was an allegation about
his brother, Abu Zaid's brother, having commented to someone
that Mr. Zaid had been inspired by some other ISIS atrocity
involving the killing of a Jordanian pilot.
And why was that even an arguable connection?  At least
there was an allegation in the prior complaint, the first
amended complaint, that that killing of the Jordanian pilot had
somehow been Tweeted about or publicized, among other ways,
through Twitter.
So there was at least there in the prior complaint some
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hyper-attenuated attempt to draw some possible connection.
That allegation is completely gone.  The Court referred to that
as the only arguable connection between Abu Zaid and Twitter
and that was extraordinarily breathtakingly attenuated.
And so, in fact, I would say that while the sleeper cell
allegation perhaps  might suggest some possible basis to assume
some connection between Mr. Zaid and ISIS, it has absolutely
nothing to do in terms of any connection whatsoever between
Twitter or Tweets on Twitter and the horrible attack in Jordan.
I have not heard Mr. Arisohn say anything about a further
amendment.  I think that that's appropriate.  He has now had
three bites at the apple.  We have now had to move to dismiss a
version of this complaint three times.  There has been no
substantive change whatsoever.
It is clear that however he attempts to label his theory,
it is a theory that seeks to hold Twitter liable for decisions
relating to go what content flows through its service.  And the
only way he could possibly ever -- he doesn't even try now any
more.  The only way he could possibly ever tie anything related
to Twitter to the attack in Jordan would be through the content
of Tweets, which he still alleges.
And so I think in light of -- particularly in light of
Section 230 and its strong policy to avoid imposition on
internet platforms of -- protracted and the burdens of
litigation, it is now time to end the proceeding here in the
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District Court.  And if Mr. Arisohn, his clients want to take
it to the Ninth Circuit, perfectly fine, but I think we've come
to an end here in this court.
THE COURT:  All right.
Mr. Arisohn, last words.
MR. ARISOHN:  If I could just address a few of those
points.
So, first, Mr. Carome said that -- you know, that the
argument about limiting content to proximate causation can't
win because proximate causation is an essential element under
the ATA.  But the same is true in every case.  It was true in
Barnes and it was true in Internet Brands.  And so I don't
think that that argument can really win the day.
And then in terms of opening an account being the creation
of content itself, I just don't think that's true.  There are
plenty of people who sign up for Twitter accounts and they
don't post a picture and they never issue a Tweet.  Any content
that comes out of their account, it might never come.  And if
it come out, it's a separate decision whether to allow that or
not.
In terms of the connection for proximate causation, if
Twitter had given ISIS a billion dollars in cash and then ISIS
went out and committed an attack, they could make the same
argument:  Well, we haven't connected what they did to the
attack.
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And just because we're not talking about cash here, we're
talking about a powerful communications tool, it's not really
any different.  They gave a terrorist organization a
communications tool and that freed up resources for them and it
helped them garner new resources to carry out many more
terrorist attacks.
And can I just address the direct messaging issue quickly,
your Honor?
THE COURT:  Yes.  Maybe I cut you off before, so go
ahead and do that.
MR. ARISOHN:  That's okay.
We have addressed this before, but I just want to
emphasize a few points here, if I can.
As you know, the CDA says that you can't treat an
interactive computer service as a publisher.  And the problem
for us in trying to figure out what that means is that the
statute doesn't define what a "publisher" is.
And so the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit has said
that if a statutory term is not defined, you need to use and
interpret the term according to its ordinary meaning.  And if
you look up "publisher" in the dictionary, it says -- it's
defined as "one who disseminates information to the public."
And so a private message cannot be published material under
this definition.
And the important thing to note here is that Congress
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easily could have defined the term.  There are plenty of
statutes, including the ATA itself, that has a "Definition"
section and they define terms when they want them to mean
something other than their ordinary meaning.  Congress knows
how to do that.  Congress did not do that here.  And so we're
bound by the ordinary meaning used in the statute, whether we
like it or not.
And the Supreme Court said in --
THE COURT:  And by the Ninth Circuit.
MR. ARISOHN:  I'm sorry?
THE COURT:  And by the Ninth Circuit.  Like Barnes,
for example, which deals directly with that issue, doesn't it?
MR. ARISOHN:  I would say that to the extent that
Barnes applied a version of a definition of "publish" that was
different from the ordinary meaning, that that Court
respectfully was mistaken.
THE COURT:  And I shouldn't follow the Ninth Circuit?
MR. ARISOHN:  Well, you might be obligated to, but it
might be something I have to bring up with them.
But, in any event, I think that might be limited to
defamation cases because it might make sense, given the history
and the purpose of the CDA, to use a definition of "publish" in
defamation cases when you're dealing with a defamation case.
But I think it's hard to imagine -- it's hard to -- and
rationalize using the defamation definition of "publish" when
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you're dealing with a terrorism case.
And because the statute says what it says and it has this
term that's not defined, we have to follow what the Supreme
Court has said time and time again, which is that:  
"Courts must presume that a legislature says in
the statute what it means and means in the statute
what it says."
And, again, I'll go back to the fact that the Ninth
Circuit has warned against expanding the CDA beyond what's
in -- written there.  Internet Brands specifically says, and
this is a quote:
"Congress could have written the statute more
broadly, but it did not."
And so as written the CDA does not apply to private
communications and so it can apply the direct messages here.
And just a few more points and then I will --
THE COURT:  Okay.  Don't make any ones that you've
already made though.
MR. ARISOHN:  I will not.
In Twitter's reply they raised the issue of JASTA, Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act.  We have not had a chance to
brief that, so this is new ground.
THE COURT:  Okay.
MR. ARISOHN:  And the defendant tries to argue that
because JASTA adds secondary liability to the ATA, that somehow
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changes the landscape of primary liability claims under the
material support provisions, like the one asserted here.
And I would just add that JASTA was intended to broaden
the ATA, not to narrow it.  And it doesn't expressly address
any of the preexisting parts of the ATA.  And when that
happens, Courts say they presume that no changes to those
preexisting parts and the underlying case law was intended.
And, indeed, the cosponsor of the bill, Senator Cornyn,
said that:  
"While JASTA clarifies the rule for secondary
liability, it doesn't impact other aspects of the ATA
such as direct liability based on the material
support provisions."
In terms of amending, I don't think there is anything that
we could do at this point with regards to the CDA.  So if
that's going to be a basis for dismissal, I'm happy to take
that to a higher court, if necessary.
On the proximate causation standard, I believe that
because JASTA does add secondary liability, that does change
the landscape there somewhat because we could add additional
claims now based on either aiding and abetting or conspiracy,
which changes the analysis somewhat.  
THE COURT:  But not with respect to the CDA.
MR. ARISOHN:  Correct.
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you both.  I am quite
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inclined -- although I will issue a written order, I'm quite
inclined to stick with where I have been.
I think the second amended complaint restructures what you
had in the first amended complaint and I don't think it changes
the analysis, but I will take one more look at it.
And assuming that I do that and that I rest on the
Communications Decency Act, I take what you say as not wanting
to amend further and so I would probably do it without leave.
Okay.
MR. ARISOHN:  Understood.
THE COURT:  Thank you both.
MR. CAROME:  Thank you, your Honor.
MR. ARISOHN:  Thank you, your Honor.
(Proceedings adjourned.) 
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